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4. IS CURTISS-WRIGHT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER
CORRECT?

Certainly, Justice Sutherland's statement in United States v.
Curtiss-WrightExport Corp.' that the President's power regarding the
conduct of foreign affairs is plenary and exclusive is not the most
unfortunate language in the Supreme Court repetoire.' Other
contenders quickly come to mind. Justice Henry Brown caused far
more harm when he wrote in Plessy v. Ferguson:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it.4
On the other hand, in Buck v. Bell,5 Justice Oliver Wendell
t Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Global Security Law and
Policy, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. B.A., 1976, Wesleyan
University; M.A., 1980, University of Rochester; J.D., 1984, University of Virginia.
1. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
2. Id. at 320.
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4.

Id. at 551.

5.

274 U.S. 200 (1927).

5133
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Holmes, Jr. demonstrated a remarkable combination of
wrongheadedness and brevity in his assertion, "Three generations
of imbeciles are enough."' The examples quickly multiply, and
Justice Sutherland's Curtiss-Wright "dicta" may not even make a list
of the top twenty-five Supreme Court flubs.7 Regardless of whether
it makes a top twenty-five or a top one hundred list, much mischief
has occurred under the banner of Curtiss-Wight.
The case arose in the context of the Chaco War, a protracted
and bloody dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay over what was
mistakenly believed to be oil-rich land known as the Gran Chaco.
International efforts to mediate the dispute failed. As the casualties
mounted, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt sought the
authority to embargo the sale of weapons to the combatants. The
result was a joint congressional resolution on May 24, 1934 that
criminalized the sale of arms to the combatants upon certain
findings and actions of the President.9 Four days later, President
Roosevelt signed the resolution and issued the requisite
proclamation making the necessary findings.1 0
There was, of course, good money to be made supplying arms
to Bolivia and Paraguay. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation was
quick to exploit this opportunity and became a major arms supplier
to Bolivia. Among the weapons that it supplied to Bolivia were
fifteen machine guns that were intended to be mounted on planes
that the company had also sold to Bolivia. The sale of those
6. Id. at 207. While this most memorable sentence of the decision was pithy
and, incidentally, factually incorrect, Justice Holmes had laid out less tersely his
disturbing argument upholding both the legality and appropriateness of eugenic
For a discussion of the case, see PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE
sterilization.
GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES:

EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT AND

BUCK

V. BELL

(2008).
7. The scare quotes around the word dicta foreshadows one of the many
problems with Curtiss-Wright. Seventy years after the decision, there is still no
consensus over whether or not its most famous passage was dicta or not. I will
discuss this question, infra at notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
8. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 311 (1936). For
a helpful discussion of the history underlying the case, see H. Jefferson Powell, The
Story of Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES, 195231 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
Specifically, the embargo and
9. H.R.J. Res. 347, 73d Cong. (1934).
criminal provisions would go into effect if the President determined that the
prohibition of such arms sales within the United States "may contribute to the
reestablishment of peace" and, "after consultation with the governments of other
American Republics" and relevant governments, he issued a proclamation to that
effect. Id.
10. Proclamation No. 2086, 48 Stat. 1744 (May 28, 1934).
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machine guns formed the basis of the prosecution of CurtissWright and others for conspiracy to violate the joint resolution."
Curtiss-Wright and its codefendants sought a demurrer to the
indictment, which a federal district court granted. Relying on the
recent Supreme Court decisions in Panama Refining Company v.
Ryan13 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States,14 the
district court concluded that the indictment was invalid because
the joint resolution had unlawfully delegated congressional power
to the President.1 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
the principal issue was, therefore, whether the nondelegation
doctrine precluded the indictment, or whether the indictment was
valid because the resolution met the requirements of that doctrine.
The Supreme Court, in a seven-to-one decision written by
Justice George Sutherland, reversed the decision of the district
court and remanded the case for prosecution. In upholding the
joint resolution against a nondelegation doctrine challenge, Justice
Sutherland first concluded that:
The investment of the federal government with the
powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the
affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to
declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make
treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other
sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the
Constitution, would have vested in the federal
government as necessary concomitants of nationality.1
Turning to the question of where this power regarding foreign
relations resided within the federal government, Justice Sutherland
famously wrote:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing
not alone with an authority vested in the President by an
exertion of legislative power, but with such authority plus
the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations-a power which does
not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress,
11.
12.
1936).
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Curtiss-Wight, 299 U.S. at 311.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 230, 235 (S.D.N.Y.
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Curtiss-Wright,14 F. Supp. at 235.
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 333.
Id. at 318.
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but which, of course, like every other governmental
power, must be exercised in subordination to the
applicable provisions of the Constitution."
There are three important points that Justice Sutherland was
making in these passages. First, under his analysis, the federal
government's power regarding international relations was
extraconstitutional in its origin. As an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, it passed seamlessly from the British government to the
union of former colonies in the instant of their independence.
There was no intermediate time during which the states themselves
were sovereign in the sense of having foreign relations powers.
Second, within the federal government, except where otherwise
indicated by the Constitution, this foreign relations power was
vested in the President. This is the aspect of Curtiss-Wright that
supporters of executive power have asserted aggressively, and which
has, at times, been the source of much mischief. Finally, Justice
Sutherland noted that, although the foreign-relations power of the
federal government was extraconstitutional in origin, it was also
subordinate to the Constitution in all instances where the
Constitution addressed the subject. Thus, notwithstanding his
conclusion that the power of the President in this area was
exclusive and plenary, he acknowledged that where the
Constitution had given specific powers in this area to Congress or
had created an area of concurrent power, that assignment
Similarly, other constitutional limitations, such as
governed.
provisions of the Bill of Rights, would presumably limit the
extraconstitutional power that he believed resided in the President.
I.

IS IT DICTUM?

The vast majority of commentators have treated justice
Sutherland's analysis, and most importantly, his description of
presidential power regarding international relations as exclusive
and plenary, as dictum. Courts generally have similarly seen this
part of the analysis as nonbinding dictum, though they have
sometimes adopted a very sympathetic approach. Nevertheless, it is
hardly clear whether Justice Sutherland's language can be
dismissed as mere dictum.
There are good reasons to characterize the notorious passage
as dictum. An examination of the United States' brief shows that it
18.

Id. at 319-20.
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did not think that the case revolved around whether or not the
President's power regarding foreign affairs was exclusive and
plenary. Rather, the Government's focus was on the nondelegation
doctrine. Specifically, the United States argued that it had been
the settled practice of Congress since as early as 1794 to make
similar delegations of authority to the President in areas of foreign
policy, where the President was best able to make certain factual
determinations, often on the basis of secret information, that
would then trigger some statutory provision.' 9 It further argued
that the Supreme Court had repeatedly upheld such delegations of
authority to the President, even in cases where the delegation was
far broader than the delegation under the joint resolution.2 0 In
other words, the United States argued that whatever the meaning
of Schechter Poultry for domestic legislation, the record of
congressional delegation to the President in instances involving
foreign policy was too well established by congressional practice
and Court approval for the joint resolution to be constitutionally
infirm.2 Even if the Court did not accept its argument based on
settled practice and prior Court approval, the United States argued,
the resolution did not fall afoul of the requirements of Schechter
Poulty.22 Thus, it was certainly possible for the Court to uphold the
joint resolution without opining on the distribution of foreign
policy power between the President and Congress.
Most commentators have since treated Justice Sutherland's
language as dictum. So, too, have the courts. Notably, none of the
authors of any opinion in the Steel Seizure Case accorded Justice
Sutherland's discussion of presidential power the status of a
holding. Indeed, the Justices barely mentioned Curtiss-Wrightat all,
even though one of the Solicitor General's arguments in support of
President Truman's takeover of the steel industry was his inherent,
19. Brief for the United States at 7-12, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp.
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (No. 98), 1936 WL 39952 at *7-12.
20. Id., at 12-17.
21. Indeed, one of the cases relied upon by the United States had been
decided less than a decade earlier. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394 (1928) (upholding statute that allowed the President to alter tariffs upon
making certain findings of fact).
22. This last argument rested on the distinction between a finding of present
fact, which the United States argued was all that the joint resolution required of
the President and the determination of future possibilities, which would amount
to setting policy by the President in violation of the nondelegation doctrine. Brief
for the United States, supra note 19, at 17-19.
23. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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nontextual power as President. In the opinion of the Court, Justice
Black made no express mention of the case. Implicitly, however,
he treated the Sutherland language as dictum. Otherwise, he
could not have written that "l[t] he President's power, if any, to issue
the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself' without expressly overruling the "holding" of
Curtiss-Wright.
In his concurrence, Justice Jackson left no doubt that he saw
the discussion of the President's extraconstitutional power to be
dictum. In addition to describing much of the opinion as dictum,
Justice Jackson rejected the Solicitor General's argument that the
President had foreign-policy powers that were not textually based.
In rejecting this argument, Justice Jackson wrote, "Loose and
irresponsible use of adjectives colors all non-legal and much legal
discussion of presidential powers. 'Inherent' powers, 'implied'
powers, 'incidental' powers, 'plenary' powers, 'war' powers and
'emergency' powers are used, often interchangeably and without
fixed or ascertainable meanings." 6
In rejecting this line of
argument, Justice Jackson made no direct reference to CurtissWright, something he would have felt compelled to do had he
thought that the Sutherland language about presidential power was
a necessary part of the decision. Moreover, even the three
dissenters grounded their decision in a textual analysis of Article II
of the Constitution rather than in the extraconstitutional power
advanced by Justice Sutherland.
Despite these strong reasons to conclude that the offending or
insightful, depending on one's perspective, passages from CurtissWright are dictum, there is reason to think that Justice Sutherland
thought otherwise.
In a sense, Justice Sutherland had been
preparing to decide Curtiss-Wright for a substantial part of his life.
As Professor H. Jefferson Powell has described, Sutherland had
wrestled with the problem of the sources of American foreignpolicy power for nearly thirty years. The problem was of sufficient
interest to him that when Nicholas Murray Butler, the president of
Columbia University, invited him to deliver a series of lectures at
Columbia, he chose the topic for his lectures. Soon thereafter, he
24. Id. at 585.
25. Id. at 637 n.2 (Jackson,J., concurring).
26. Id. at 646-47 (Jackson,J., concurring).
27. Id. at 667-710 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). Justices Reed and Minton joined
ChiefJustice Vinson's dissent.
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turned those lectures into the book, ConstitutionalPower and World
Affairs.
By the time Justice Sutherland faced the task of writing for the
Court in Curtiss-Wright, his thinking on the issue had further
evolved from what he had said in his lectures and book. Yet, much
of his analysis in Curtiss-Wright flowed directly from his book. His
premise that the sources of the federal government's domestic and
foreign powers were different, with the latter derived not from the
constitutional text but from nationhood and sovereignty, drew
directly from his earlier thinking. The important innovation of
As
Curtiss-Wright was to assign this power to the President."
Professor Powell shows, even though Justice Sutherland would also
describe the settled practice of congressional delegation to the
President in matters of foreign affairs, his long-percolating theory
was fundamental to his analysis. Historian Charles Lofgren likewise
the theoretical
Sutherland,
concludes that for Justice
that plenary
his
claims
underpinnings of the decision, including
and exclusive presidential power over foreign affairs is inherent in
sovereignty itself, were a necessary component of the decision.
While Justice Sutherland ultimately described the decision as both
grounded in "principle and in accordance with precedent,"
Professor Lofgren concludes that "there is no basis for regarding as
dictum Curtiss-Wright's contention that federal power involving
foreign affairs rests on a different base than federal power in
Whether his brethren read the opinion the
domestic affairs."3
33
same way is, however, questionable.
II. THE HARMFULNESS OF CURTISS-WRIGHT

Were the only problem with Curtiss-Wright the ambiguous
status of Justice Sutherland's characterization of executive power,
nobody would much care about the case. Those of us who
remember its invocation by Colonel Oliver North and its
trumpeting by the minority report of the Iran-Contra

28. See Powell, supra note 8, at 217-21.
29. Id. at 222-23.
30. Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation:
An HistoricalReassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 31 (1973).
31. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936).
32. Lofgren, supranote 30, at 31.
33. David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice
Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 494 (1946).
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Congressional Committee have a vivid sense of the harm that
14
The minority report embraced a
Justice Sutherland unleashed.
reading of Curtiss-Wight that permitted virtually unchecked
presidential power in the realm of foreign affairs. Reciting Justice
Sutherland's quotation and mischaracterization of Congressman
(and subsequently Chief Justice) John Marshall's identification of
the President as the "sole organ of the nation in its external
relations," the committee minority found that President Reagan
and his agents were free to disregard congressional restrictions on
sales of arms to Iranian "moderates" and aid to the Contras in
Nicaragua because Congress had no constitutional authority under
36
which to limit the President's plenary and exclusive power.
The ranking Republican House member on the committee
and a principal architect of the minority report was Congressman
The lessons of Iran-Contra were not lost on
Dick Cheney."
Congressman Cheney, and as Vice President he was generally
regarded as the fiercest advocate for expansive presidential power
within the George W. Bush administration: The reverberations of
the minority report are discernible in such disregard for
congressional limits as the Bush administration's warrantless
wiretaps in disregard of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
40
39
1978' under its terrorist surveillance program. One early critic of
34. See Minority Report, in REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No. 100-433, S. REP. No. 100216, at 471-78 (1987) [hereinafter Minority Report]. And those of us who watched
both the Watergate hearings and the Iran-Contra hearings experienced a vivid
demonstration of Karl Marx's comment, "Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts
and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He
forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce." KARL MARX, THE
EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF Louis BONAPARTE 15 (International Publishers Co.
paperback ed. 1963) (1852).
35. Curtiss-Wight,299 U.S. at 319.
36. Minority Report, supra note 34, at 473-74. It should be remembered that
this argument presses Justice Sutherland's analysis beyond his apparent intent,
since he recognized that his extraconstitutional power was subject to constitutional
limitations, including grants of authority to Congress.
37. Sean Wilentz, Mr. Cheney's Minority Report, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/09/opinion/09wilentz.html.
38. See id.
39. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-71 (2006). Under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(f) (2006), FISA
provides the only means under which such surveillance should have been
permissible.
40. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16
2005,
16,
Dec.
TIMES,
N.Y.
Karl Marx did not think to describe
/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=1.
history's second repetition. Perhaps he would have said that it repeats itself as
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the decision characterized it as dangerously antidemocratic.
According to Charles Levitan, Justice Sutherland's theory "is the
furthest departure from the theory that United States is a
constitutionally limited democracy. It introduces the notion that
national government possesses a secret reservoir of unaccountable
",41

power.
Curtiss-Wight's mischievous reach has not been limited to
justification for rogue covert operations emanating from the White
House. It has also been a source of legal overreach by U.S.
Attorneys, the Justice Department, and other law-enforcement arms
of the federal government. As Dean Harold Koh has noted,
"Among government attorneys, Justice Sutherland's lavish
description of the President's powers is so often quoted that it has
come to be known as the 'Curtiss-Wight, so I'm right, cite.'"4 One
example of such overreach is the Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC") of the Treasury Department's attempt to block the assets
of Kindhearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development, Inc.,
pending its determination of whether or not the charity is a
"specially designated global terrorist."43 Relying on Curtiss-Wright's
assertion of the President's plenary power over foreign affairs, the
Government argued that OFAC need not operate under Fourth
44
Amendment constraints, an argument thatJudge Carr rejected.
Finally, while not necessarily expressly invoked by the Court in
its avoidance of deciding cases involving claims of misuse of
presidential power in foreign affairs, the deferential spirit of CurtissWright seems to haunt the Court's political-question decisions. For
example, during the Vietnam War, federal courts invoked the
political-question doctrine, along with such other justiciability
barriers as standing and ripeness rules, to avoid consideration of
45
challenges to the lawfulness of the war.

opera buffa, or, had he been able to foretell the future, as an Eug ne lonesco play.
41. Levitan, supranote 33, at 493.

42. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CoNTRAAFFAIR94 (1990).

SHARING

43. Kindhearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F.
Supp. 2d 857 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
44. Id. at 876-88.
45. See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d. Cir 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 869 (1971) (beyond determination that there was "some mutual
participation between the Congress and the President," issue of legality of the war
is a nonjusticiable political question).
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III. BUT DID HE GET HIS ANALYSIS RIGHT?
The short answer is that Justice Sutherland's analysis was
deeply flawed and incorrect. Perhaps the most significant wrong
turn was to abandon constitutional text (despite its scantness
regarding some foreign affairs matters) in favor of a theory of an
extraconstitutional basis for the nation's foreign affairs powers.
Once launched on a search for an extraconstitutional solution,
Justice Sutherland was almost certain to engage in shoddy law
office history with perverse results. 46
Historian Paul Finkelman has warned us of the difficulties of
uncovering a meaningful and reliable understanding of original
intent of the authors and ratifiers of the Constitution. He doubts
that "we can safely rely on such an investigation for a dispositive
interpretation of the Constitution today." 47 He further notes that
most historians of the period concern themselves with different
questions from the lawyers' debates about original meaning
because "the debate seems far removed from what historians do,"
and "most historians believe that the quest for original intent is
futile at best."48 Once again, it is useful to turn to Justice Jackson as
a source of eloquently stated wisdom. In the Steel Seizure case he
writes:
Just what our forefathers did envision or would have
envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be
46. Law-office history refers to the practice of lawyers, judges, and sometimes
law professors, to cherry pick bits of historical evidence with little understanding
of context or historical practice for the purposes of advancing a particular client's
position or cause. In one other area where the Supreme Court has relied on its
understanding of the preconstitutional understanding of sovereignty, the Court's
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has made a doctrinal, textual, and
historical hash, as a result of an amateurish, ideologically driven attempt to do
history. This reign of error, which is beyond the scope of this essay, began in Hans
v. Louisiana,134 U.S. 1 (1890) with an abandonment of any fealty to constitutional
text and has culminated in the Court's decisions in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996), and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). Those seeking a
more reliable historical treatment of this area can profitably begin with the works
of Professors John Orth and Edward Purcell. JOHN ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF
THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987);
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex Parte Young and the Transformation of the Federal Courts,
1890-1917, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 931 (2009); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly
Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History, and "Federal
Courts,"81 N.C. L. REV. 1927 (2003).
47. Paul Finkelman, Intentionalism, the Founders, and Constitutional
Interpretation,75 TEX. L. REv. 435, 444 (1996).
48. Id. at 437, 438.
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divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams
Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A
century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly
speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or
less apt quotations from respected sources on each side of
any question. They largely cancel each other.
Yet, since Justice Sutherland has, in effect, thrown down the
gauntlet, we have little choice but to try to make sense of
constitutional (and perhaps extraconstitutional) history to test his
theory. Fortunately, the task of debunking purported definitive
readings of original intent may be easier than that of providing a
The historical
dispositive reading of the text or urtext.
commentary has not been kind to Justice Sutherland's analysis and
has left it pretty much in tatters.
The earliest critiques of Justice Sutherland's analysis took him
on his own terms and reexamined his historical evidence and
argument. They found his history "shockingly inaccurate."50 They
have uncovered considerable evidence that after the break with
Britain, the states did consider themselves as sovereign and the
union of the states through the Continental Congress a marriage of
convenience that might be temporary.51 Nor did his use of Justice
Story's writings on sovereignty or of then-Congressman Marshall's
comment regarding the President as the sole organ support Justice
More recently, Professor Michael Ramsey
Sutherland's analysis.
has argued quite powerfully that whatever the view on the
possession and meaning of sovereignty at the time of the
Declaration of Independence and the Revolutionary War, neither
the constitutional text nor the practices of the states and of
Congress under the Articles of Confederation support Justice
Sutherland's interpretation.
In the end, Justice Sutherland's theory stands up badly. His
notion of an extraconstitutional source of the nation's foreign
relations power leads into a metaphysical and an historical rat hole.

49. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952)
(Jackson,J., concurring).
50. Lofgren, supra note 30, at 32 (quoting Paul L. Murphy, Time to Reclaim:
The Current Challenge of American Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REv. 64, 76
(1963)).
51. See Levitan, supranote 33, at 480-90.
52. Lofgren, supra note 30, at 13-17, 24-25.
53. Michael Ramsey, The Myth of ExtraconstitutionalForeign Affairs Power, 42
WM. & M.RY L. REv. 379, 395-431 (2000).
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Despite some care on his part to recognize constitutional
limitations on the President's power, his theory and language have
been used for constitutionally indefensible purposes.
Certainly,
the Constitution intends for the President to wield considerable
power in certain aspects of foreign affairs, from serving as
commander in chief to negotiating treaties on behalf of the United
States. Nonetheless, it is also clear that the Framers were deeply
concerned about unchecked presidential power in the realm of
foreign affairs. This concern was most clearly true regarding the
55
power to initiate war and to maintain a military force.
As most commentators have argued (at least until they are
employed in some administration's Department of State or
Department of Justice), the Constitution creates a system of
56
concurrent, and sometimes conflicting, power over foreign affairs.
Each of the coordinate branches has a role to play. As Professor
Edward Corwin noted over fifty years ago, "the Constitution ... is
an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American
foreign policy."5'
Justice Sutherland's theory and assumptions are wrong. That
does not mean that they will quietly fade away. They will not,
because they represent one side of the struggle that Professor
Corwin described so long ago. It is important not to exaggerate the
importance ofJustice Sutherland's dictum. Had he not written the
opinion, the impulse on the part of the executive to stretch its
powers would still have required an ideological and doctrinal
rationale, as would the impulse of Congress to at times flex its
muscles in this area and at others to flee responsibility and
54. As Antonio said, "Mark you this Bassanio, the devil can cite Scripture for
his purpose .... 0, what a goodly outside falsehood hath." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 3.
55. See Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1543,
1603-06 (2002) (arguing that the framers intended the Declare War Clause to give
Congress the broad power over acts of war, rather than just proclamations of war);
Michael D. Ramsey, Text and History in the War Powers Debate: A Response to Professor
Yoo, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1685, 1703 (2002) (arguing that the commander-in-chief
power is distinct from the broader power to initiate war, which the framer's
reserved to Congress); William Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to
Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 21-28 (1972) (arguing that
under the original meaning of the Constitution, the President's continuing use of
military forces in Vietnam was unauthorized after congressional repeal of the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution).
56. This is the general theme of Harold Koh's book. KOH, supra note 42, 2-3.
57. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERs, 1787-1984, 201
(1984).
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acquiesce in the desires of the President. That battle will continue.
In the end, it may be bad history, but at least five members of
the Supreme Court and the acceptance of their decision by the
American people determines whether or not it is good law. There
is every reason to think that this will remain contested terrain for a
long time.
6. SHOULD KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED EVER BE BROUGHT TO
TRIAL?

The question contains a suggestive negative pregnant. If not a
trial, what? Presumably the old-standby methods of totalitarian
regimes, defenestration, the terrible "fall" down the stairs in an
"escape attempt," or purported death by suicide are off the table.
Since no one has suggested simply releasing Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed (KSM), that would leave the alternative of indefinite
detention as a prisoner of war for the remainder of a war with no
end in sight. The alternative, however, is a depressingly bad one.
Towards the end of World War II, the victorious allies
confronted the question of what to do with the Nazi leadership.
Winston Churchill was loathe to try these men and strongly
advocated for summary execution.
Stalin, apparently in jest,
declared that 50,000 German general staff officers should be
killed. The genius of Nuremberg was the rejection of this idea
and the insistence that the trials be credible. The four prosecuting
nations certainly had reason to seek vengeance and reason to want
to eliminate the Nazi leadership quickly and efficiently, thereby
minimizing any future threat of a Nazi resurgence. Nevertheless, at
Nuremberg, they chose to substitute the rule of law over vengeance
and efficiency.
As a nation, we try those whom we suspect of having
committed a crime. Since we believe to a near certainty that KSM
masterminded the September 11 attacks, we might do better to
reverse the question. Why wouldn't we bring him to trial? Because

a trial (or at least a plea agreement) is our norm, the burden

58. One thinks of Jan Masaryk in post-World War II Czechoslovakia found in
his courtyard a purported suicide by a leap from his bathroom window and Steven
Biko in South Africa, killed by an aggressive interrogation and torture session in
the custody of South African police, passed off as the result of a hunger strike and

suicide attempt.
59.

TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALs 30 (1993).
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should rest on advocates of indefinite detention without trial to
show why a trial would be inappropriate.
The question as posed begs the question of where to try KSM,
and, in large measure, so will I. Much has been written about the
relative virtues and flaws of Article III courts, specialized hybrid
courts created to try terror cases, and military commissions as
venues for suspects in terror cases. The question does not beckon
me to join that argument, and I will happily let the opportunity
pass. Nevertheless, without delving into the reasons for my
preference, I will note that I have a strong preference for a federal
district court as the appropriate forum. Regrettably, in the short
term, it has become politically impossible to try KSM in a federal
district court. I will, nevertheless, assume that the politically
impossible is indeed possible, and in arguing that we must try KSM,
I will assume that such a trial would take place in a federal district
court.
Some of the arguments that have been made against trial are
specific to federal district courts. Some concerns, such as the costs
of security and traffic control, seem greatly overstated. All but a
handful of terrorism prosecutions have happened in federal district
court without the parade of horribles, suggested by opponents of
trials in civilian courts, having occurred. Other prosecutions, such
as those involving organized crime or drug gangs, also pose security
issues, but the federal district courts have proven to be up to the
challenge. Nor is there much reason to credit the concern that
were KSM to be tried in Manhattan, al Qaeda would be prompted
to target Manhattan. They have shown that they already have New
York City in their sights without any additional encouragement.
One reason why a government might decide to avoid trial, at
least temporarily, is because the particular detainee has become an
intelligence asset and taking him to trial is likely to end any
intelligence value the person might have. It is hard to know how
valuable KSM was as an intelligence source, since he is reputed to
have given us bad intelligence intermingled with accurate
intelligence. At this point, however, he has been in custody for so
long that it is unlikely that he has any information that would still
be fresh and useful.
Other objections to trial stem from the difficulty that we
created for ourselves by subjecting KSM to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment in addition to torture. First, there is the
problem of further embarrassment. It will be impossible to try
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KSM in any venue without broaching the subject of his treatment in
detention. This is unfortunate, but, I believe, unavoidable. We
have not faced our own behavior in this matter and have held
virtually no one accountable for any acts of torture or mistreatment
done by us or on our behalf, except for mostly low-level
implementers of the practice of torture rather than those who
crafted the policy, as we saw in response to the Abu Ghraib scandal.
Given this flight from accountability, there may be a beneficial, if
painful, effect of an official discussion of our behavior toward
detainees.60 Further, there is little that the world has not heard
about our use of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or,
indeed, torture, and probably less that they have not imagined.
Any discussion of the mistreatment of KSM in our hands can only
reveal so much that is new. One might say that this is all water,
towel, and detainee under the bridge, and in the rushing river.
The world, in other words, and those who might be persuaded
not to side with our enemies against us, already has a certain
narrative in mind regarding the United States and torture. By
facing our behavior soberly and honestly, and by trying to create
the atmosphere where a fair and credible trial can occur, we might
shift the narrative in our favor.
There is the very practical question of the legal impact of the
abusive treatment and torture on any evidence, including any
confession, obtained later by other interrogators using traditional
policing methods. The issue is, of course, whether a "clean-team"
of interrogators can be understood as sanitizing the record,
allowing any subsequent confession to be introduced at trial." The
law is not terribly clear on this matter. This might present a
problem no matter what venue we decide to try KSM or even if we
decide to hold him in administrative detention as a POW and allow
him periodic reviews of his status. While we know that the required
minimal process protections may vary from circumstance to
circumstance, we also know that some degree of fairness and
reliability will be demanded by the court of any procedure we used
to hold KSM.
60. For a discussion of our national difficulty with facing unpleasant aspects
of our past and current behavior and the strategies of avoidance that we adopt to
avoid self-understanding or accountability, see Robert N. Strassfeld, American
Innocence, 37 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 277 (2006).
61. For a thoughtful exploration of these issues, see Gregory S. McNeal, A
Cup of Coffee After the Waterboard: Seemingly Voluntary Post-Abuse Statements, 59
DEPAULL. REv. 943 (2010).
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Finally, a frequently voiced objection is the likelihood that
defendants such as KSM would use the platform of the trial to put
the United States on trial and to propagandize for their cause. We
should not assume that any judge tasked with trying such a case is
incapable of controlling her or his courtroom. Nevertheless, it is
true that a public trial will afford KSM a platform and there is no
reason to think that he would not attempt to take advantage of it.
Are we so frightened, however, that we would lose that argument?
Do we have any doubt that we do not have the more compelling
case to most of those whom we would hope to influence?
In the end, that is why we do trials. They are, of course, means
for resolving disputes, righting wrongs, and uncovering the truth
(within the limits of the rules of procedure and evidence). They
are also public performances through which we announce to the
world something about our beliefs and values and our sense of
ourselves and our society. We engage in the trial process, in other
words, not only in the hope of finding the truth and rectifying
wrongs, but for the expressive impact of the trial.6 And we engage
in the trial process to give voice to those who have been wronged.
We create a public record for those victims to acknowledge their
sense of injury.
None of this happens perfectly.

Establishing a historical

record is no guarantee that those who have done wrong or have
tolerated it will come to see their past in a new light. The record of
Holocaust denials reminds us that no amount of evidence will
satisfy those who are intent on their own distorted and hateful
understanding of the past. Because we expect to accomplish a
variety of things by holding trials, not simply the public
performance of a particular account of events, our rules of trial
653
may advance one end at the expense of another. Nor are victims
made instantly and magically whole. Yet, despite the imperfections,
the victims almost always see revelation and acknowledgement to
be critical to any attempt atjustice.
62. MARK A. DRUMBL, ATRocrY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-18
(2007).
63. See id. at 173-79 (explaining the central goal of "expressivism" is the
crafting of a historical narrative, but, at the same time, that goal is hindered by
four aspects of the criminal trial process: production of only selective truths,
interruptions during the trial process, poor management strategies, and plea
bargains).
64. Peter R. Baehr, How to Come to Terns with the Past, in ATROCITIES AND
BEYOND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 6, 18 (Edel
INTERNATIONAL ACCoUNTABILTIY:
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Were we to forego a trial of KSM, the republic would not fall.
Nevertheless, we would have failed to create a public record of the
crimes that were committed on September 11, 2001, and KSM's
role in those crimes. We would also have failed the surviving
victims by denying them their voice.
Events have partly overtaken this essay as it moves towards
publication. On Monday, April 4, 2011, Attorney General Eric
Holder announced that KSM and four others would stand trial for
Notably, Attorney General Holder
the September 11 attacks.
underscored the need "to bring the conspirators to justice"a
without further delay either for the victims' families or for the
defendants. Regrettably, because of congressional opposition the
most appropriate forum for these trials, a federal district court, is
While the current iteration of the military
unavailable.
commissions is an improvement over the earlier versions, questions
remain about the constitutionality of aspects of their procedure.
Further, they are tainted both by their association with the earlier
versions of the military commissions and by their association with
Guantanamo, as well as by arguments made by any number of their
supporters that they are a preferable forum because they are more
likely to guarantee convictions. Attorney General Holder has
concluded that this is an instance where we should not make the
perfect the enemy of the good. The challenge will be to prove his
intuition right.

Hughes, William A. Schabas, and Ramesh Thakur, eds. 2007).
65. Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., Statement of the Attorney General on the Prosecution of
the 9/11 Conspirators (Apr. 4, 2011), http://wwwjustice.gov/iso/opa/ag
In addition to KSM, the indictments
/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110404.html.
included charges against Walid Muhammad bin Attash, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Ali
Abdul-Aziz Ali and Mustafa Ahmed al Hawsawi.
66. Id.
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